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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
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APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT ORDER 
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STATEMFNI "' ""!" '-"""I |nN 
Jurisdiction is conferred ppellate court pursuant to 
Rule 3(a) litr-ih Rules Appellate Procedure and §78-2-
i I1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the Court's Order premature? A Motion to Dismiss is 
a matter granted with great caution in negligence cases. The 
appellate court has the right to review this action to determine 
whether the caution was taken or whether the facts presented should 
have been allowed to be considered by the trier of fact. 
2. Did this incident fall within the bounds of the release 
signed by Plaintiff? 
3. Does the case law cited by Defendant and relied upon by 
the Court exclude gross negligence and/or willful and wanton 
conduct? 
4. Are the terms of the release clear enough to qualify as 
an exculpatory clause under the circumstances of this injury? 
Ambiguous clauses in a release are matters of fact and must be 
reviewed in favor of those facts being considered by the jury. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arises out of a "bungee" jumping incident which 
occurred on July 21, 1994. Plaintiff, a novice at bungee jumping, 
advised all parties that this was her first time. She advised the 
worker at the ticket booth who required that she sign a release and 
advised the worker on the platform. On the platform prior to 
jumping, she asked the attendant if she could hold on to the 
supporting cord. The attendant told her that she could and 
2 
specifically instructed her where to place her hands. Upon 
jumping, a sliding sleeve over the cord struck her hands and caused 
substantial and permanent damage to her fingers. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Was the Court's Order premature? The Plaintiff had no 
opportunity to engage in discovery to determine standards of care 
in the industry, to determine if there were any governmental 
standards applicable to the equipment or to determine the training 
or state of mind of the applicable attendants. 
2. Did this incident fall within the bounds of the release 
signed by Plaintiff? There is a substantial question as to whether 
this particular set of circumstances fell within the "four corners" 
of the release. This is a factual question for the trier of fact 
and not a question of law. 
3. Does the case law cited by Defendant and relied upon by 
the Court exclude gross negligence and/or willful and wanton 
conduct? Plaintiff believes that the case law does exclude this 
type of conduct and that Plaintiff is entitled to have a trier of 
fact determine the level of negligence or conduct prior to a ruling 
on the merits. 
4. Are the terms of the release clear enough to qualify as 
an exculpatory clause under the circumstances of this injury? 
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Cases believed to be determinative of the stated issues are as 
follows: 
Bovce v. West. 862 P.2d 592 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) 
Hewitt v. Miller. 521 P.2d 244, 
ARGUMENT 
A. Defendant's Motion is Premature 
Plaintiff had just filed its Complaint and a Motion to Dismiss 
at that time was premature. Plaintiff believes that discovery 
would have provided testimony that the actions of the employees of 
Defendant fall outside the normal purview of a general release. 
Plaintiff was entitled to obtain that discovery before a Motion to 
Dismiss could be entertained. 
A Motion to Dismiss should be granted with great caution in 
negligence cases. See Bowen v. Riverton. 656 P.2d 434 (1982). 
The question of the sliding sleeve on the cord which caused 
Plaintiff's injury, safety factors, training of employees, action 
of employees or agents, or whether they meet governmental standards 
are questions that further require discovery. 
Plaintiff did not allege violation of appropriate governmental 
standards at this point due to that information not being in 
Plaintifffs hands at the time. Plaintiff is certainly entitled to 
enter into discovery to determine whether the equipment referred to 
in the Complaint was defective. 
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B. This Incident Did Not Fall Within the 
Bounds of the Release 
Plaintiff points to the portion of the release which reads as 
follows: 
I am hereby aware that shock cord jumping. . .is a hazardous 
activity. . .and I am voluntarily participating in this 
activity with full knowledge of the danger involved. . . 
Plaintiff will testify that following the explicit instructions of 
the Defendant with the resultant permanent injury to her hands was 
not within the purview of the "full knowledge" referred to in the 
release. 
The question of whether the "full knowledge" referred to in 
the release should have included the knowledge of possible loss of 
use of the hands due to a sleeve on the cord is a jury question and 
not the basis for a Motion to Dismiss. 
The same argument applies to the portion of the release which 
states: 
•I shall not make a claim against. . .Free Spirit 
Recreation. . .for injury. . .caused. . .as a result of my 
participation in shock cord jumping. 
Again, there is a question as to whether this type of injury was 
foreseeable as participation in shock cord jumping, especially 
given the peculiar facts of this incident. There is a question of 
whether this was participation by the employee which is outside of 
the purview of the release. 
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Plaintiff contends that the paragraph of the release which 
states: 
I am in good physical health or have notified Free Spirit 
Recreation of any physical impairments, or limitations (i.e.; 
history of any heart or back or neck problems, SI joint, 
pelvis, eye surgery, etc.) that may affect my physical and 
mental well being during or after shock cord jumping 
activities. . . 
would give a reasonable person the basis to believe, together with 
a lay person's understanding of the forces involved in shock cord 
jumping, that these are the areas of the body at risk. There is no 
reason to believe that a participant would lose a finger. 
Interpretation is certainly an issue for the jury, especially where 
there was an express instruction from an employee. 
The cases cited by Defendant involve injuries within the 
reasonable expectations of a person participating in those 
activities. 
C. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Unconscionable Provisions 
The law is well settled that the general principle of allowing 
persons to contract for themselves has its limits. An established 
exception is that if a contract is unconscionable, in whole or in 
part, the court may, on equitable grounds, refuse to enforce the 
unconscionable provisions, or it may construe the contract to avoid 
an unconscionable result. Biesinaer v. Behunin, 584 P.2d 801, 803 
(Utah); Russell v. Park Citv Utah Corp.. 548 P.2d 889, 891 (Utah); 
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Carlson v. Hamilton. 332 P.2d 989, 991; See also 5 Corbin on 
Contracts. 1057, 1068, 1075. 
Allowing unfettered freedom from liability certainly falls in 
the unconscionable area. This would allow employees of a facility 
similar to Defendant to rough-house on the platform or use 
significantly inferior cords causing death or serious injury 
without fear of any responsibility. 
Plaintiff reiterates and incorporates herein by reference her 
initial response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
This is apparently a case of first impression in Utah, since 
the bulk of Defendant's references are from outside jurisdiction. 
The two Utah cases cited refer to indemnity agreements which are 
totally different from the present case. Review of Defendant's 
cites indicate other factors which the Court must consider. 
In Boyce v. West, 862 P.2d 592 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), the 
Court states: 
Exculpatory clauses are strictly construed and must be clear 
if the release from liability is to be enforced. 
Boyce at p. 595 
The same case provides an out for gross negligence: 
[Boyce] further contends there are issues of material fact 
whether the defendants were grossly negligent. If 
[defendant's] acts fell greatly below the standard established 
by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk 
of harm, the releases are unenforceable. 
Boyce, at 597 
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Plaintiff has continually contended that Defendant's agent, by 
specifically instructing Plaintiff where to put her hands, and 
reassuring her that no injury would result, acted at least in a 
grossly negligent manner, if not wanton and/or malicious. Again, 
this is a question for the finder of fact to determine. 
The court in Hewitt v. Miller. 521 P.2d 244 stated: 
The court also recognized that the release in question is not 
a valid defense to factually supported causes of action based 
upon. . .wilful and wanton misconduct. . . 
Hewitt, at 245. 
Plaintiff again reiterates that the evidence, through discovery, 
will show that Defendant's agents acted in a wilful and wanton 
manner, or at least were grossly negligent. Hewitt also referred 
to the injury as being "an inherent danger" to the sport involved. 
Here, the injury to the fingers could not be considered to be "an 
inherent danger" and therefore the release is invalid. 
In Schutkowski v. Carey. 725 P.2d 1057, also conditioned the 
imposition of the release "subject to willful misconduct 
limitations" (Schutkowski. at 1059) . The same holds true for Cain 
v. Cleveland Parachute Training Center. 457 N.E.2d 11185, Milligan 
v. Big Valley Corp.. 754 P.2d 1063, Lee v. Allied Sports 
Associates. Inc.. 209 N.E.2d 329, Moss v. Fortune. 340 S.W.2d 902, 
LaFrenz v. Lake County Fair Board. 360 N.E.2d 605, Owen v. Vic 
Tanny's Enterprises. 199 N.E.2d 280, Haines v. St. Charles 
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Speedway, Inc., 874 F.2d 572, and DeBoer v. Florida Offroaders 
Driver's Ass' n. . Inc., 622 So.2d 1134. 
Defendant cannot contend that the release excuses Defendant 
from gross or wilful or wanton misconduct which would fall into the 
category of being against public policy and be therefore an 
exclusion to all the cases cited by the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, Plaintiff requests that the Court reverse the Trial 
Court's granting of Defendant's Motion on the grounds that there 
are material issues of fact which need to be resolved by a jury at 
trial, or, in the alternative, that Defendant's Motion be denied 
with leave re-submit their motion after discovery has been 
obtained. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of December, 1995 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES 
RONALD E. DALBY / 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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